ABSTRACT: Secret image sharing is a useful way to protect a secret image by sharing it to several shadow images. The proposed scheme is an improvement of the secret image sharing method, in order to prevent the shadow images from revealing the shape of the original secret image. For the reason that the adjacent pixels of an image is highly close, the shadow images, the result of the general image sharing process, always give out the shape information of the secret which can be the main target of rivals. An improved method to solve this problem is using a function, also called the key, to permute the pixels of the original image before sharing process, but the custody of the key brings new troubles. The proposed scheme offers a special method to generate the key using the secret image itself, so there is no need to safeguard the key.
INTRODUCTION
With the development of computer technology and the rapid growth of the Internet, data transmission based on web has been into almost every common field, from civil to military applications. Digital image becomes the most import of network transmission media, because it is vivid and contains much information.
Digital images can be used to record and save kinds of information, such as photo, secret document and so on. Images transmission in the network must be encrypted to ensure the safety and secrecy of the images in many applications, such as military records and confidential business data. The common approach to protect the image is ordinary data encryption and steganography [1, 2] . But there is a drawback of these techniques. The image is protected in a single information carrier. If the adversary looks up an exception in that information carrier, he/she may try to decode the secret data or destroy directly the whole information carrier. So, the secret image or data is lost. To solve this problem, the image secret sharing mechanism has been concerned widely [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The principle of the secret image sharing is to divide the secret image into n images called shadow images or shares which are totally irrelevant to the secret image. The n shares are sent to n participant for saving, respectively.
When needed, the secret image can be recovered with k or more out of n shares together, while k or fewer shares reveal no information about the secret image. We also call this principle a (k, n) threshold scheme.
The secret image sharing scheme originally derives from the secret sharing for the secret key [8] [9] [10] . According to the safeguard of the secret key, Shamir [11] and Blakley [12] proposed a (k, n) threshold secret sharing independently in 1979. The main idea of Shamir's method is the Lagrange interpolating polynomial over Fp={0, 1, …, p}, which any k different points are enough to determine one polynomial f(x), while that of Blakley's is linear projective geometry. Since it is easy for these schemes based on interpolation polynomial to be implemented and be understood, these schemes based on interpolation polynomial have been got more attention. Two schemes mentioned above are perfect, which means that a secret can generate n shares by the (k, n) threshold, in such a way, any k out of n shares can recover the secret exactly, whereas any k-1 or fewer shares reveal information about the secret. It can be seen that perfect is an important issue to check whether the secret sharing is security or not. The original idea of the secret sharing technique is to solve the problem of the secret key management. A secret key is usually constructed by the Pseudo-random generator, so it is completely disorder to ensure the adequate security of the encrypted information. Thus, the adversary is difficult to conduct other data in the secret from part of the secret key. The subtlety of secret sharing scheme is reflected to take into account the mathematical structure, which can ensure the security of keys and other general data. However, image secret sharing not only focuses on security, integrity and accuracy on the level of its data, but also needs to consider the nature of the image information on the level of the human visual system. When the information of images is organized regularly, it can be distinguished by the human visual system. It means that it is a closely correlation between neighbor pixels of the image.
Digital images can be represented as a traditional matrix notation [13] (we call it the pixel matrix in this paper), whose element is pixel. For a digital image, the elements of the pixel matrix are not randomly distributed, but there is a strong correlation between these pixels. The color of images is distributed in local scope and has certain continuity. So, the value of neighbor pixels may be very similar or even identical. For instance, most of the background patterns of images are based on the same color, but it just has a progressive or decreasing change in the pixel value. This particular nature of images brings a little trouble for image secret sharing. The encryption style of secret sharing on the data logic level cannot eliminate the fundamental correlation between neighboring pixels. If the secret image is shared via secret sharing schemes for a common data, the shadow images may leak out the shape of the secret image. Then, a small part of the pixel is exposed, which is easy to suffer from rival attacks. If the correlation of the adjacent pixel values is relatively large, the shadow image may carry little shadow or outline of the secret image. Hence, less than k shares may still recover the secret image so that the threshold scheme is not perfect. The security of image secret sharing is reduced. Most image secret sharing schemes [14] [15] [16] [17] based on Interpolation polynomial choose the continuous and unprocessed pixels instead of random numbers as the coefficients of the polynomial. Since the neighbor pixels have similar values, the generated shadow images may include much information about the secret image. Less than k shadow images can reconstruct the secret image from the leaked information, so this approach is not security. To improve the security of this scheme, use a key to form a permutation sequence and then permute the pixels of the secret image, however, how to save the key is a new problem. For example, Thien and Lin [16] , Bhadravati [17] presented the image secret sharing scheme with a certain manner, which leads to extra cost of operation and bring the new problem how to safeguard the key. Therefore, it is useful for the research to find a preprocess method of a key without keeping. From data itself, the method disrupts the correlation between pixels of the image and provides the data without rules for image secret sharing.
To solve the mentioned issues above, a preprocessing method with scrambling based on bit-XOR is proposed in this paper. Combined with a combination of image data itself, this method disrupts the relationship between the characteristics of the image pixels and then provides the data without rules for secret sharing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related works. Section 3 introduces the method of a key without safeguarding and the image secret sharing scheme. The design and result of the experiment is shown in Section 4. Conclusion is presented in Section 5.
RELATE WORKS

Shamir's secret sharing scheme
Shamir's scheme [11] for sharing a secret is based on interpolation polynomial. Its basic idea is that any k different points are enough to determine one polynomial f(x) of degree k-1, say
where p is a prime number. To construct the (k, n) threshold, we assume that the secret data D is a number which is smaller than p, and set a0 = D, other coefficients in f(x) are pick up from Fp randomly, and then we can evaluate the values D1 , … , Dt. Given any k of these Di values, the coefficients of f(x) are computed by interpolation, and then evaluated D=f(0). With regard to knowledge of just k-1 or less of these values, there is no information about D.
Thien-Lin's image secret sharing scheme
In 2002, Thien and Lin [16] designed a (k, n) threshold image secret sharing according to Shamir's scheme. We call it Thien-Lin's scheme in this paper. A secret image is divided into several parts. Each part has k pixels. Let k pixels be the coefficients of polynomial. Until all pixels of all parts are the coefficients and calculated, the process is done. There are two methods in Thien-Lin's scheme: one is lossy and the other is lossless. The lossy method must truncate all the gray values larger than 250 of the secret image to 250. And the detail is as follows:
Sharing phase:
Step 1. Truncate all gray values between 251 and 255 of secret image to 250. Then a new secret image S is formed.
Step 2. Use a key to establish a permutation sequence to scramble the pixels of the secret image S. After scrambling, a permutated secret image S′ is completed.
Step 3. Sequentially take k unprocessed pixels of S′, and let k pixels be coefficients as the k-1 degree polynomial:
Step 4. Use 1 to n instead of the x in above polynomial, respectively. Then the value of qj(1), … , qj(n) can be calculated. The n values generate n pixels for the n shadow images.
Step 5. Repeat Step 3 and 4 until all pixels of S′ are processed.
Reveal phase: When any k or more shadow images are obtained, we can use the Lagrange interpolation polynomial to reveal the secret image.
Step 1. Take the unprocessed pixel from each of the k shadow images. Obtain the corresponding (xi, qj(xi)), i=1, 2, … , k. According to the Lagrange's interpolation, the values of k coefficients a0, a1, … , ak-1 are calculated. And save the k values into matrix E′.
Step 2. Repeat Step 1 until all pixels of the k shadow images are processed. Then the whole matrix E′ is established.
Step 3. The matrix E′ corresponds to the image S′.
Step 4. Applying the inverse-permutation operation by the key to form the permuted image, which is the secret image S. the reveal phase is done.
The other method is lossless in Thien-Lin's scheme [16] . It can reveal the secret image exactly without any pixels loss.
3 THE PROPOSED SCHEME Image secret sharing is different from the secret sharing for a common number, for there is a closely correlation between neighbor pixels of the image. The color of images is distributed in local scope and has certain continuity. The value of neighbor pixels may be very similar or even identical. If the secret image is shared directly by the threshold structure, the generated shadow images may leak out the key point or the shape of the original secret image. Therefore, we must scramble the pixels of the secret image by a key before sharing to disrupt the correlate between neighbor pixels, and then go to share the secret image. But a new problem will come out, which is how to safeguard the key. Consequently, a preprocess method with scrambling based on bit-XOR is proposed in this paper. All pixel values of each row of the image operate XOR and the result is regarded as a key, named K. In such a way that a preprocess method without a key is established. The basic framework of the proposed image secret sharing is shown as Figure 1 . Thien-Lin's scheme [16] and other kind of schemes [17] need an extra key to generate a permutation sequence to permute the pixels of the secret image and then the key must be kept, while the proposed scheme gets the permute secret image (named encrypted image) via the key. The key is generated by the image data itself according to the characteristics of the image. There is no need to keep the key. And then the encrypted image is shared. If enough shadow images gather, the encrypted image can be recovered exactly. Finally, the recovered encrypted image applies the inverse-permutation operation to get the original secret image by the key generated by the same method.
The process of scrambling the secret image
The detail of the secret image V using the permutation operation to generate the encrypted image V′ is as described in the Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
The process of scrambling the secret image is:
Step 1. For a give m×n secret image V, it is regarded as a pixel matrix.
Step 2. Get the pixel values and all pixel values are represented by the matrix A:
where ai, j is the pixel value, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Step 3. Construct a null pixel matrix B with the size same as matrix A.
Step 4. All pixel values in j-th row of matrix A perform an XOR operation and obtain the result, which is denoted by sumj = aj,1⊕aj,2⊕…⊕aj,n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and sumj is the j-th key Kj.
Step 5. A row of matrix A is regarded as unit. All pixel values of j-th row perform XOR operation with sumj, and get a new pixel value aj, i′ where aj, i′= aj,i⊕ sumj. Then save the aj, i′ into the corresponding position of matrix B. When n is even, i satisfies 1 ≤ i ≤ n. When n is odd, i satisfies 1 ≤ i ≤ n-1, meaning the last pixel value of that row do not perform the XOR operation.
Step 6. Repeat
Step 5 from j = 1 to m. We can get the matrix B with all pixel values, which correspond to the new image V′ (named encrypted image).
Depending on the nature of XOR operation (a⊕a = 0, a⊕0 = a, and the exchangeable property), the sum result of one row of the encrypted image V′ after XOR operation is described as follows: When n is even, an′ = an⊕sum. It means the result sum′ is calculated by XOR operation with (n-1+2) sum. For sum = a1⊕a2⊕…⊕an, the following expression sum′=sum is satisfied. When n is odd, an′ = an. It means the result sum′ is calculated by XOR operation with (n-1+1) sum. For sum = a1⊕a2⊕…⊕an, the following expression sum′=sum is satisfied as well. The result obtained by all pixel values of a row of the encrypted image V′ perform XOR operation is equal to the result obtained by all pixel values of the corresponding row of the secret image V perform XOR operation, that is sum′=sum. Therefore, if the encrypted image V′ is obtained, we can do the inverse-process operation to get the secret image V.
The process of inverse-permutation operation
From the previous section we know, when the encrypted image V′ is known, the original secret image can be reconstructed via the inverse-permutation operation. The detail of the process is described as the Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2
The process of recovering the secret image from the encrypted image is:
Step 1. For a given m×n encrypted image V′, it is regarded as a pixel matrix V′.
Step 2. All pixel values in each row of matrix V′ perform an XOR operation and obtain the result, which is denoted by sumj′, 1 ≤ j ≤ m;
Step 3. A row of matrix V′ is regarded as unit. The encrypted image applies inverse-permutation operation. All pixel values of j-th row perform XOR operation with sumj, and get a new pixel value aj,i = aj,i′⊕ sumj, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then save the aj,i into the corresponding position of the empty matrix. When n is even, i satisfies 1 ≤ i ≤ n. When n is odd, i satisfies 1 ≤ i ≤ n-1, that means the last pixel value of that row do not do the XOR operation.
Step 4. Repeat Step 3 until all rows of matrix V′ are performed. Then the secret image V is recovered.
Similarly, we can also use a column of a pixel matrix as unit to generate a key Ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The basic idea is similar to the above step. If we want to enhance the security of scrambling process, we can first perform the XOR operation based on a row of a pixel matrix, and then do the XOR operation based on a column of a pixel matrix, vice versa. But the complexity of the algorithm is increasing, and the method will do depending on specific circumstances.
From the above analysis, there is no need to keep the key K after scrambling process. We can share the encrypted image directly by the (k, n) threshold scheme, and send the shadow images to each participant. When k or more shadow images comes together, the encrypted image can be recovered, and then the key K can be obtained via the encrypted image. Finally, the original secret image can be obtained by the inverse-permutation operation. If k-1 or fewer shadow images gather, it is hard to get the encrypted image. Some pixels are lost, so the key K is hard to be known. The original secret image is not recovered. Consequently, during the sharing process, using this scrambling process, on the one hand, it can reduce the risk of attacking a part of sensitive pixel values; on other hand, it can avoid new security issues of keeping the key.
The process of generating shares
The process of generating shares is described as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3
Step 1. Scramble the pixels of the secret image S by the proposed method. After scrambling, a permutated secret image S′ (or named the encrypted image) is completed.
Step 2. Sequentially take k unprocessed pixels of S′, and let k pixels be coefficients as the k-1 degree polynomial:
Step 3. Use 1 to n instead of the x in above polynomial, respectively. Then the value of qj(1), … , qj(n) can be calculated. The n values generate n pixels for the n shadow images.
Step 4. Repeat Step 3 and 4 until all pixels of S′ are processed. Then the n shadow images are generated.
Step 5. Send n shadow images to n participants, respectively. Delete the secret image and the encrypted image. The sharing process is done.
The process of recovering the secret image
When any k or more shadow images are obtained, we can use the Lagrange interpolation polynomial to reveal the secret image. The detail is described as Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4
Reveal phase:
Step 4. Apply the inverse-permutation operation to get the secret image S. The reveal phase is done.
THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
In order to verify the feasibility of our scheme, we do experiments comparing our scheme to the Thien-Lin's scheme without a key. Firstly, we do a (2, 3) threshold secret image sharing example comparison between the two scheme. Then, we set a (4, 6) threshold example to analyze the security of our scheme. In experiments, we treat the 24-bit color image as three separate gray images, just as three color layers (R, G, and B). Experiment platform: Intel i3 3.07 GHz CPU, 3G RAM, Windows 7 PC machine， Visual Studio 2012 software.
Comparison between the two scheme
The secret image is divided into several shadow images through the threshold of Thien-Lin's scheme without using a key for permuting. The result is illustrated in Figure 2 . And the shadow images are generated after preprocessing the secret image by our proposed method shown as Figure 3 . Figure 2 illustrates an instance of (2, 3) threshold of Thien-Lin's scheme without using the key for permuting, just sharing the secret image directly. The secret image is 512×512 pixels and each share is 512×256 pixels. Pictures (1) ~ (3) are generated shares. From Figure 2 we know that, the shapes or even the key information of the secret image can be clearly seen from pictures (1) ~ (3).
As shown in Figure 3 , there is an example of (2, 3) threshold of our proposed scheme by scrambling the secret image, where the secret image and the encrypted image are the same size with 512×512 pixels and each share is 512×256 pixels. Picture (0) is the encrypted image generated by the secret image scrambling according to our proposed method. Pictures (1) ~ (3) are generated shadow images by sharing the encrypted image. Obviously, it is hard to know any information of the secret image from pictures (1) ~ (3).
From the above two illustrations, we know that share the secret image directly by the threshold based on interpolation polynomials, and the generated shadow images will almost expose much information of the secret image. So, it doesn't exactly play a role of protecting the secret image. Generally, to solve this problem, use a key to form a permutation sequence, permute the pixels of the secret image, and then sharing the permuted image. However, how to save the key is a new issue. Then the security and the practicality of that image secret sharing schemes will greatly be reduced. According to the nature of the image itself, the proposed scheme firstly scrambles the secret image without saving any keys to form the encrypted image, and then sharing the encrypted image. The generated shadow images will not leak out any information about the secret image. It plays a role of protecting the security of the secret image and the practicality of the proposed scheme is not compromised. (6) is the generated shadow images with 120×20 pixels by sharing the encrypted image. Picture (#′) is the recovered encrypted image by collecting any 4 or more out of picture (1) ~ (6). The size of picture (#′) is 120×80 pixels with the same as picture (#). Picture (#′) applies the inverse-permutation operation to get picture (0′). Picture (0′) is the same as the picture (0), meaning the recovered secret image is the same as the original secret image.
A (4, 6) threshold example
The encrypted image is obtained by the secret image scrambling, and then sharing the encrypted image. The generated shadow images will not leak out any information about the secret image. It plays a role of protecting the secret image. There is no need to worry about custody of the key. When k or more shadow images come together, the encrypted image can be recovered by the (k, n) threshold. According to Algorithm.2 in 3.2, the key K can be obtained via the encrypted image and the original secret image can be obtained by the inverse-permutation operation. If k-1 or fewer shadow images gather, it is hard to get the encrypted image because of the threshold. The original secret image is not recovered.
CONCLUSIONS
Most image secret sharing schemes must use a key to generate a permutation sequence and then the key must be kept. However, how to keep the key will bring new issues. To solve the problem, an image secret sharing scheme without safeguarding a key is proposed in this paper. A preprocessing method with scrambling based on bit-XOR is presented. Combined with a combination of image data itself, this method disrupts the relationship between the characteristics of the image pixels and makes the pixels data disorder for secret sharing. Consequently, the preprocess method with scrambling proposed in this paper can naturally avoid other security problems caused by keeping the key.
